Link above is to google pics where we can create albums for all of our
photos! So far the ablum above is for our D.C. trip... ENJOY!
Saturday, November 10, 2007
Washington D.C. Photos- Picasa link
Tuesday, November 6, 2007
Secrets of Power Negotiating
• The author argues that win-win occurs so rarely in
business that we should discount it altogether.
• "Power Negotiating" – Is a way in which one
negotiates so that their opponent believes he or she
has won.
• There are several "moves" or negotiating positions
we can use to create this appearance to the other
side.
Ask for More than You Expect to Get
• Henry Kissinger "Effectiveness at the negotiating
table depends upon overstating demands."
• Asking for more than one expects raises the
perceived value of what you are offering and prevents
deadlocking.
o (ex. Persian Gulf War: President Bush gave Saddam
Hussein a clear and precise opening position leaving
no room for movement – the goal was not to negotiate
but deadlock Hussein giving justification for attack)
• Avoid inadvertently creating deadlocks by not asking
for more than you expect to get (if the other side
expect you to move and you can't then there is no room
to negotiate).
• Start with your Maximum Plausible Position and imply
flexibility; MPP is the most one can ask for and still
seem credible. Opponent may think, "That's outrageous
but there does seem to be some room to move…"
Never Say Yes to the First Offer
• Weakens a position by suggesting two things:
o Opponent could have done better.
o Something must be wrong.
1. Flinch
? Always react with shock and surprise at the other
side's proposals.
? If one doesn't flinch it makes the other person a
tougher negotiator.
? With about 70% of people the visual overrides the
auditory.
2. Avoid Confrontation
? Get in the habit of agreeing initially, use the
"Feel, Felt, Found" formula:
• "I understand exactly how you feel about that. Many
people have felt exactly the same way. But you know
what we have always found? When we took a closer look
we found… [they changed their minds]"
Play the Reluctant Buyer or Seller
• "Wish number" (ideal highest price) and "walk away"
price, typically an offer will fall between these
prices on the second offering.
• Counter argument to above: "I don't think there's
any flexibility in our price, but if you tell me what
it would take to get your business, I'll take it to my
people (using a higher authority as a foil) and see
what I can do for you with them (setting up to play
good guy/bad guy)."
The Vice Technique
• Often just saying: "You'll have to do better than
that," can garner surprising results.
• However, skilled negotiators will retort, "Just how
much do I have to do?"
Don't Worry About Price
• Price is a bigger concern to the seller than the
buyer. Often if we can explain selling features
adequately, price is no object.
Set It Aside
• Place hot-button items on the back burner and
address them when rapport has been established.
• If a stalemate is reached, try to regain momentum
by: changing negotiating teams (esp. someone who may
have irritated the other side), or considering a
different venue (dinner or lunch). Also, explore:
extended credit, reduced deposit, restructured
payments, or specification changes, in addition to
packaging or alternate delivery methods. Discuss ways
of risk sharing.
The Art of Concession
• Don't set up a pattern in the way you make
concessions. Equal-sized concessions will accustom the
other side to expect more.
• Never make a large last concessions, it doesn't look
final if it's too big, and refusal to make further
small concessions aren't viewed well.
Make Time Your Ally
• 80% of concessions will occur in the last 20% of the
time remaining, so keep in mind the following:
• The longer you spend in negotiations with an
opponent, the more likely they will come around and
see your view bit-by-bit.
• Be cautious, the same can apply to your stance as
well – don't fall into the same trap.
• Deadlines are valuable pieces of information, use
them to your advantage, but disclose only with great
discretion your own.
The Most Dangerous Moment
• People are most vulnerable at the point when they
think the negotiations are over. Watch your emotions,
some tend to give in on items they would not
otherwise.
• Rationalizing, "If I give in on this one small
piece, I won't have to renegotiate or risk loosing the
sale," is very dangerous.
• Best rebuttal: "I don't have the authority to make
any concessions now." If other side persists, show
them the hard price in writing.
Your Most Powerful Weapon
• Learn to develop walk-away power, that is to say
never let the thought of loosing an
sale/item/house/price/etc. become so ingrained
as a must have that you loose the ability to walk away
from the table.
• If you can't do this at any time, the other side
knows it and will use it to their advantage.
• "There's no such thing as a sale you have to make at
any price, or the car or home for you, or a job or
employee you can't do without. The minute you think
there is, you've lost."
-Del
__________________________________________________
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Monday, November 5, 2007
IB
--
Maggie Mariscal
Preparatory Reading on Senator Chambliss
As BB contributed the IBW earlier, I would like to share Senator Chambliss' bio and voting record website with you in advance (and to the benefit) of our D.C. trip on Wednesday!
http://www.vote-smart.org/voting_category.php?can_id=22029
Highlights:
Gender: Male
Family: Wife: Julianne
2 Children: Lia, Bo.
Birth date: 11/10/1943
Birthplace: Warrenton, NC
Home City: Moultrie, GA
Religion: Episcopalian
Education:
JD, University of Tennessee College of Law, 1968
BA, Business Administration, University of Georgia, 1966
Attended, Louisiana Tech University, 1961-1962.
Professional Experience:
Attorney, Business Law and Agricultural Law
Partner, Moultrie Inn.
Political Experience:
Senator, United States Senate, 2002-present
Representative, United States House of Representatives, 1994-2002
Primary Candidate, United States House of Representatives, 1992.
Organizations:
Colquitt County Economic Development Authority
Georgia State Bar Disciplinary Review Panel
Leadership Georgia
Moultrie-Colquitt County Chamber of Commerce
Moultrie-Colquitt County Economic Development Authority
Youth Sports Coach, Young Men's Christian Association.
Caucuses/Non-Legislative Committees:
Congressional Fire Services Caucus
Congressional Sportsmen Foundation
Juvenile Diabetes Caucus
National Guard Caucus
Rural Health Caucus
Senate Caucus on Military Depots, Arsenals and Ammunition Plants
Co-Chair, Senate Reserve Caucus
Steering Committee.
Moreover, he's a Scorpio!!
One warning sign, though: Over the course of several weeks in 2002, this candidate repeatedly refused requests by citizens in the candidate's own state, leaders of both major political parties, major news organizations and Project Vote Smart staff to provide voters with essential issue information in the 2002 National Political Awareness Test.
This candidate would not provide this information to citizens in the candidate's own state - no matter who asked them, when they were asked or how they were asked.
Campaign Finances:
2001-2006 Total Receipts: $12,176,383
2001-2006 Total Spent: $10,098,821
Cash on Hand: $2,080,492
82% of his PAC contributions came from Businesses (vs. Labor and or Ideological/Single Issue)
85% of his PAC contributions have been fully disclosed
Recent Votes:
YES - Prohibiting Funds for Groups that Perform Abortions
(this is currently in contrast to GA Supreme Court, however)
YES - Passage of Legislation to Update Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
YES - Passage of Drought Mitigation Steps by Army Corps
NO - Amtrak Reauthorization
Enjoy!
--
Carol Sautter
404-610-6660
cj_sautter@yahoo.com
The article offers a tool for use in negotiating important issues. The
"Negotiation Checklist" helps to be prepared before walk into a negotiation. It
is based on proven principles of negotiations that are taught in several of
North America's top business schools.
NEGOTIATION CHECKLIST
A. About you
1. What is your overall goal? The big picture. Is what do you hope to
accomplish
2. What are the issues? Price, delivery schedules, duration of contract,
product or service upgrades, cancellation clauses, contingency plans,
transportation services, and many other options. In general, the more issues you
can put on the table (with reason), the better off you are.
3. How important is each issue to you? Picture their relative importance. On
which issues should you stand firm and on which issues can you afford to
concede?
Develop a scoring system for evaluating offers:
(a) List all the issues of importance from step 2.
(b) Rank order all the issues
(c) Assign points to all the issues (assign weighted values based on a
total of 100 points).
(d) List the range of possible settlements for each issue. Your
assessments of realistic, low, and high expectations should be grounded in
industry norms and your best-case expectation.
(e) Assign points to the possible outcomes that you identified for each
issue.
(f) Double check the accuracy of your scoring system.
(g) Use the scoring system to evaluate any offer that is on the table.
4. What is your "best alternative to negotiated agreement" (BATNA)? Backup
plan. Consider negotiating with the only supplier in town or having many
alternatives.
5. What is your resistance point (i.e., the worst agreement you are willing
to accept before ending negotiations)? If your BATNA is vague, consider
identifying the minimum terms you can possibly accept and beyond which you must
recess to gather more information. The worst agreement you are willing to accept
before ending negotiations.
B. About the Other Side. The final agreement will reflect not only your own
preferences, but the other party's as well. Thus, it is useful to ask the same
questions about the other party as you ask about yourself.
1. How important is each issue to them (plus any new issues they added)?
2. What is their best alternative to negotiated agreement?
3. What is their resistance point?
4. Based on questions B.1, B.2, and B.3, what is your target? Set target
based on what you know about the other side.
C. The situation. These are additional contextual factors to consider to help
you maximize your advantages and minimize your risk of making mistakes.
1. What deadlines exist? Who is more impatient? The negotiator who feels a
greater sense of urgency will often make rapid concessions in an effort to
secure a deal quickly.
2. What fairness norms or reference points apply? The abstract discussion may
be less threatening or emotionally charged than the negotiation details, and may
result in a more cooperative tone and outcome for the negotiation.
3. What topics or questions do you want to avoid? How will you respond if
they ask anyway? If there are things you do not want to discuss, prepare your
deflections in advance and polish them until they are seamless.
D. The Relationship between the Parties
1. Will negotiations be repetitive? If so, what are the future consequences
of each strategy, tactic, or action you are considering? Consider whether you
expect or want to continue a business relationship with the party across the
table.
2. (a) Can you trust the other party? What do you know about them?
Inquire how this company conducts negotiations. How much you trust the other
party will influence your negotiating style.
(b) Does the other party trusts you?
3. What do you know of the other party's styles and tactics? Different
negotiators have different personal or cultural preferences. You are likely to
secure the best deal and have the most positive interaction if you learn about
their style in advance and try to accommodate it.
4. What are the limits to the other party's authority? Most negotiators,
unless they are the CEOs of their companies, are authorized to negotiate only
certain specified issues and within certain ranges.
5. Consult in advance with the other party about the agenda. Consider calling
the other party beforehand to share what issues you plan to discuss and to ask
what issues the other party might raise.
--
Jaime A. Latorre
Article: Rethinking the Culture-Negotiation Link
By Robert J. Janosik
(Summarized by CS)
Practicing negotiators have tended to rely on the concept "culture," or on related notions like national style, to explain behavior encountered at the international bargaining table. Since the notion of culture as an explanatory tool holds such allure for negotiation analysts, this paper will examine the treatment of "culture" with important consequences for the understanding of the culture-negotiation connection. I have identified 4 distinct approaches: culture as learned behavior, culture as shared value, culture as dialectic and culture-in-context.
CULTURE AS LEARNED BEHAVIOR
The notion of culture, and searching for the organizing principles behind it, resorts to generalizations based on the observed typical characteristics and behaviors of the inhabitants of a particular geo location. Therefore, the focus if often on what negotiators do, rather than what they think – with very little analysis of when/why/how the behavior pattern occurs (which relies greatly on the sensitivity of the observer).
• In 1716 de Callieres wrote "On the Manner of Negotiating with Princes" and hypothesized that there is a direct relationship b/w negotiating behavior and place of birth (Spanish diplomats never act in haste and always try to conclude with an advantage).
• In 1963 Harold Nicholson wrote "Diplomacy" and suggests that a nation's diplomacy is a function of the country's norm and values (there are differences in the theory/practice of the Great Powers…caused by variation in national character, etc.).
• The first US Consul General to Japan, Townsend Harris, got increasingly frustrated by long-enduring trade negotiations in 1930 and vented: "the Japanese do not regard the promise they gave me last…to lie, for a Japanese, is simply to speak."
• In 1970, Howard F. Van Zandt's "How to Negotiate in Japan" noted 13 distinctive behavior characteristics commonly encountered by Americans in talks with the Japanese (avoidance of 'no', gift-giving, etc.).
• Flora Lewis' observations of US-Saudi Arabian relations in 1979 continue the theme of experiential observations: "the Arabs nod their heads and listen, but this does not mean that they agree."
These writers, then, view their task in terms of making it possible for others in the same position to successfully manage for others in the same or similar future situations. Although this is very valuable, it's also a very limited approach.
CULTURE AS SHARED VALUE
A second commonly-applied approach is where the analyst will search for a central cultural value or norm that distinguishes each of the groups being compared – assuming that thinking precedes doing and that one's thinking patterns derive from one's cultural context. From the practitioner's point of view, this is quite appealing (much as the first option) because it suggests an almost inevitable (thereby predictable) pattern of negotiating behavior.
• Mushakoji Kinhide in 1976, contrasted US and Japanese negotiating styles. US = erabi culture, Japanese = awase. Erabi = a behavior seqeuence whereby a person sets the objective, develops a plan based on the objective and then acts to change the environment according to the plan (present a clear statement of position and expect the same). Awase = assumes the environment must be adjusted to (prefer infer the other's position, avoid early commitments).
• "Smart Bargaining: Doing Business with the Japanese" (Graham and Sano, 1984) point to a set of cluster values that contribute to the Japanese style: amae (indulgent dependency), wa (the maintenance of harmony), and shinyo (gut feeling). According to the authors, Americans have a tendency to negotiate in "John Wayne Style" – preferring short, informal negotiations that emphasize the quality of the participants.
Another variant of this approach is to regard the nexus of culture/negotiation to a nation's ideology, of which there are 3 recognized: Liberalism, Fascism and Communism.
• In 1968, Kenneth T. Young examined the history of US-Chinese negotiations from the perspective of their ideology: "a Chinese Communist negotiator is an ideologist more than anything else…Maoist ideology has enclosed China w/in a new ideological wall." "Typically, then, this kind of negotiator tried to outflank his opponent and weaken him by every conceivable means at every possible point."
• In 1951, "Negotiating with Russians" finds that Western observers usually ascribe deception, dissimulation, rigidity, non-accommodation, hostility and harassment to both Soviet and Chinese Communist diplomatic representatives.
CULTURE AS DIALECTIC
This is a different model of the makeup of culture in negotiations, based on a proposed identity made up of sets of polar opposites. This model was created in response to criticisms of the other models that offered only simplified single culture values; this one is defined by the tensions/dialectics that exist embedded in every culture. And whereas the other models were static and unchanging, this one allows both individual variation and changes over time. However, this model not deterministic and is therefore more difficult to wield in negotiations with great utility.
• Michael Blaker's "Japanese International Negotiating Style" (1977) cites two forces in Japanese negotiations: "harmonious cooperation" (avoid discord at all costs within the social/business matrix) and "the warrior ethic" (encourages risk-taking in dogged pursuit of a cause). Both have strong grounding in Japanese history, both are legitimate.
• He also describes 5 norms of Japanese bargaining action: overcoming domestic opposition, dispelling western resistance, secrecy, careful deliberations and situational adaptation; and 3 norms of Japanese negotiating tactics – optimism, fatalism and nonmoral pragmatism. (probe/push/panic tactical style of negotiating)
CULTURE–IN–CONTEXT
The fourth approach is the most complex, and suggests that human behavior can only be accounted for by understanding three primary components – the individual's personality, cultural values and the social context in which the individual operates. (Any less than this multi-faceted overview is inadequate, per the proponents of this model.) This model is now greatly favored by analysts, because it holds in common the assumption that though culture is important, it is not the only contributor to an individual's negotiating behavior. Rather, culture is interdependent, interactive. Particularly important are the factors that define the individual negotiator (age, gender, religion and personality) as well as those factors which define the context of the negotiation. In other words, nationality/culture does have in important role to play, but any generalizations about the nationality/culture nexus may require modification to account for the age, religion, gender mentioned above. But
as the complexity of this model increases, its utility for the practitioner decreases (fewer 'do's and don'ts, more complex answers).
OBSERVATIONS
The goals of the scholars and the participant-observers differ somewhat, and so there has been a tendency to dismiss or downplay the problems of definition and conceptualization in the examination of the various 'contributory' factors to the phenomenon of negotiation. Practitioners prefer either the 1st or 2nd model for its high degree of predictability concerning the behavior of the target group; scholars prefer either the 3rd or 4th that are more psychological and make prediction more complex and risky enterprise. So although all the models are important, the 1st and 2nd approaches have more to do with what has been called 'etiquette', and although this is an important conversation, but it must ultimately move on to more complex matters that lie at the heart of understanding if there's some trans-national, trans-cultural understanding of the fundamental nature of negotiation itself.
IBWA Here We Come!!!
We're visiting the International Bottled Water
Association (IBWA) in DC. Here are some FAQs, enjoy!!
BB
What is IBWA?
What is the International Bottled Water Association?
The International Bottled Water Association (IBWA) is
the trade association representing the bottled water
industry. Founded in 1958, IBWA's membership includes
U.S. and international bottlers, distributors and
suppliers.
Who Are Our Member Companies?
IBWA member companies range in size from the original
family-owned and operated water bottlers to giant,
diversified food corporations who have added bottled
water to their product lines. From the manufacturers
of equipment to small distributors, to the rapidly
increasing number of international members, are all
important segments of the bottled water industry and
IBWA.
Why Do Companies Become IBWA Members?
IBWA plays an active role at all levels of state and
federal government assisting in the development of
stringent regulations for bottled water to ensure the
greatest safety possible and high quality of bottled
water products. IBWA has supported the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration and state regulators/legislators
in the development of strict regulations that will
help guarantee bottled water's quality.
IBWA has also developed a Model Code which has been
used as model regulation in many states. Additionally,
as a condition of membership, bottlers must submit to
an annual, unannounced inspection administered by an
independent internationally recognized third-party
organization. This inspection assures that all IBWA
bottler members meet federal, state and IBWA
requirements for the production and sale of bottled
water.
Bottled water code:
http://www.bottledwater.org/public/pdf/IBWA05ModelCode_Mar2.pdf
Negotiation Techniques
Negotiation Techniques
Summary: Lawyers who understand these common negotiation techniques can plan their strategies more effectively. They can enhance their skill in the information phase, increase the likelihood that they will achieve acceptable agreements during the competitive phase, and endeavor to maximize the gains obtained for their clients in the cooperative phase.
I.
Three Formal Phases of the Negotiation Process
· Try to learn as much as possible
· Determine underlying needs and interests behind opponent's positions
· Decide what information you are willing to disclose vs. what you are required to disclose
· Use blocking techniques to minimize unnecessary disclosure
B. Competitive Phase – articulation of your own demands
· Principled Offers and Concessions – High, but rational objectives, rational explanation for changes of position
· Argument – Factual and legal arguments, emotional appeals in some circumstances
· Threats and Promises – Overt and implicit threats, less challenging warnings, "split the difference approach" (one side promises to move halfway if the other side does too)
· Silence and Patience – The more you talk, the more information you disclose and the more concessions you make
· Limited Authority – Actual or fabricated, used to obtain a psychological commitment to settlement and to get concessions before actual negotiation begins
· Anger – likely to offend opponents and disclose information, used to show seriousness
· Uproar – threatening dire consequences, need to consider how likely it is to actually happen
· Settlement Brochures and Video Presentations – states factual or legal basis for a claim
· Boulwareism – "best offer first" or "take it or leave it"
· Br'er Rabbit – use reverse psychology, make opponent feel like you have accepted an unfavorable argument
· Mutt and Jeff – One reasonable negotiator professes sympathy toward the concessions made by the other party, while his partner rejects each new offer as insufficient (good cop/bad cop)
· Belly Up – wolves in sheepskin, effectively refuse to participate in negotiation process
· Passive-Aggressive Behavior – such as showing up late for meetings, not bringing important documents, failing to write up agreed-upon terms
n Explore alternatives that might enhance the interests of both sides
n Parties can initial or sign their current agreement, and then seek to improve their joint results
n Still a competitive phase, using power-bargaining techniques
II.
B. Ask for more than you expect to get
n "Effectiveness at the negotiating table depends on overstating demands"
n Maximum Plausible Position – most you can ask for and still be credible
C. Never say yes to the first offer
· Flinch – always react with shock and surprise
· Avoid Confrontation – agree initially and then turn it around (Feel, Felt, Found Formula)
D. Play the reluctant buyer or reluctant seller – "wish number" and "walk-away price"
E. The Vise Technique – "You'll have to do better than that"
F. Don't Worry about Price – find other ways to make opponent feel like he/she is winning
G. Higher Authority – say that you have to consult with a higher authority, opponent will make more concessions to a person they don't see or know
H. Don't Split the Difference – let the opponent suggest splitting the difference, makes them feel like they won something
I. Set it Aside – focus on other issues, then change the people in the negotiating team or the venue
J. The Art of Concession – don't fall into a pattern of concessions, don't make equal-size concessions, never make the final concession a big one
K. Make Time Your Ally – more time = more concessions (80% of concessions occur in last 20% of negotiations)
L. The Most Dangerous Moment – most vulnerable is when you think the negotiations are over, don't show emotions or disclose any information
M. Your Most Powerful Weapon – Walk-Away Power – give the impression that you can walk away from the negotiations at any time
Sunday, November 4, 2007
Negotiation Techniques: How to keep the Br’er Rabbit out of the Brier Patch
• Three phases of the negotiation process
• The information phase-each party endeavors to learn
as much as possible about the other side's
circumstances and objectives
• The competitive phase-negotiators try to obtain
beneficial terms for their respective clients
• The cooperative phase-multiple-item transactions are
involved, parties may enhance their joint interests
II. The Information Phase
• Focus in this phase is always on the knowledge and
desires of the opposing party.
• Negotiators must learn as much as possible about the
opposing side's range of potential and actual choices,
its preferences and their intensity, its planned
strategy, and its strengths and weaknesses.
• Negotiators must decide ahead of time what
information they are willing to disclose and what
information they must disclose if the transaction is
going to be fruitful.
• Blocking techniques should be planned in advance in
order to minimize unnecessary disclosure.
III. The Competitive Phase
• Negotiators articulate their own side's demands
• "Principled" offers and concessions
a. Successful negotiators establish high, but
rational, objectives and explain their entitlement to
these goals
b. Must provide opponents with a rational explanation
for modifications of their position.
• Argument
a. Factual and legal arguments are advanced.
b. Emotional appeals may be effective in some
circumstances.
c. Should be presented in comprehensive rather than
conclusionary manner.
• Threats and promises
a. Almost all negotiations involve the use of overt or
at least implicit threats; but must be believable.
b. Threats show the recalcitrant party, the cost of
disagreeing with offers.
c. A credible threat is one that is reasonably
proportionate to the action it is intended to defer ?
small ones are ignored, bug ones dismissed.
d. Negotiators should never use threats they don't
intend to carry out b/c it will undermine credibility.
e. Affirmative promise-"split the difference"? one
side agrees to move halfway and the other does the
same
• Silence and patience
a. Patience can be used with silence, it shows the
silent party that a response will be required before
further discussions.
• Limited authority
a. Whether fabricated or not, it allows the negotiator
to say they don't have the final authority and must
"check" with their absent principal before making a
final commitment.
b. The adversary hopes to get several concessions as a
prerequisite to negotiations with a negotiator with
real authority.
• Anger
a. If negotiators become angry, the may offend their
opponent and disclose information that they did not
wish to divulge.
• Aggressive behavior
a. Meant to convince an opponent of the seriousness of
their position, also to maintain control over the
agenda.
• Uproar
a. A few negotiators may try to obtain an advantage by
threatening dire consequences if their opponent does
not give them what they want.
• Settlement brochures and video presentations
a. A brochure states the factual and legal bases for
the claim being asserted.
b. Video depicts the way in which the defendant's
negligent behavior caused the severe injuries of the
plaintiff.
• Boulwareism
a. Determine ahead of time what willing to offer, and
formulate a complete "best-offer-first" package.
b. Present it as take it or leave it, and allow the
opposition time to prove that there is some
miscalculation or is circumstances changed.
c. Make one fair, firm offer for the case.
• Br'er Rabbit
a. Can be usd against win-lose opponents who do not
evaluate their results by how well they have done but
by an assessment of how poorly their adversary has
done.
• Mutt and Jeff
a. A seemingly reasonable negotiator professes
sympathy toward the "generous" concessions made by the
other while his partner rejects each new offer as
insufficient, castigating opponents for their
parsimonious concessions. The reasonable partner will
then suggest that additional concessions will have to
be made if there is any way to satisfy his associate.
• Belly-up
a. This type of bargainer is the most difficult to
deal with because they effectively refuse to
participate in the negotiating process.
b. Negotiators must force this person to negotiate and
never allow them to alter their planned strategy.
• Passive-aggressive behavior
a. This type of negotiator will use various tactics
like forgetting important documents or showing up late
to meetings.
IV. The Cooperative Phase
• Each side should prepare alternative formulations by
transferring certain terms from one side to the other
while moving other items in the opposite direction.
When these options are shown, then each negotiator
must candidly indicate whether any of the proposals re
preferable to the accord already achieved.
V. Satisfying Clients
**BRIDGET**
Saturday, November 3, 2007
Rethinking the Cultural-Negotiation Link
Robert J. Janosik
Tuesday, October 30, 2007
SENATOR CHAMBLISS BIO
next week...here's his bio...check out his website for
his current publications...ENJOY!!
http://chambliss.senate.gov/public/index.cfm
On November 5, 2002, Saxby Chambliss was elected
Georgia's 63rd United States Senator in what was one
of the most stunning and historical victories of the
2002 elections. Georgia Trend Magazine has named him
one of Georgia's Most Influential Georgians and says
"he is a highly visible and well-respected presence in
Washington," and "has a reputation as an affable but
straight-talking lawmaker."
Chambliss is a member of the Senate Armed Services
Committee, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and
the Senate Rules Committee and he is the Ranking
Republican Member of the Senate Committee on
Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry.
During the 109th Congress, Chambliss served as
Chairman of that committee and, according to the
Congressional Research Service, is the only senator
since 1947 to have chaired a full standing Senate
Committee after serving in the Senate for just two
years.
In Georgia, agriculture supports one in every six
jobs, an ever-present reminder in Chambliss' long time
championing of national and home state farming
concerns. Long before his election to Congress,
Chambliss specialized in representing farmers' legal
interests in South Georgia. During his four terms in
the House, Chambliss was instrumental in drafting two
farm bills and reforming the federal crop insurance
program through his chairmanship of the Agriculture
Subcommittee on General Farm Commodities and Risk
Management.
Additionally, Chambliss' leadership and experience on
the issues of terrorism, homeland security, and
intelligence matters earned him an appointment to the
prestigious Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
where he steadfastly advocates that our U.S.
intelligence community must dramatically improve its
information sharing and human intelligence gathering
abilities. To ensure our troops on the ground and the
new Director of National Intelligence have access to
the most timely and accurate intelligence, Chambliss
has authored legislation calling for the creation of a
Four Star military command for intelligence within the
Department of Defense. Chambliss' previous role as the
chairman of the House Intelligence Subcommittee on
Terrorism and Homeland Security made him one of the
leading congressional experts on these issues.
The Savannah Morning News said Senator Chambliss
"knows how to do his homework and how to stand up to
pressure, as demonstrated by his performance as
chairman of the House Intelligence Subcommittee on
Terrorism and Homeland Security, which investigated
intelligence lapses prior to the terrorist attacks in
New York and Washington in 2001."
Immediately following the tragic attacks, Chambliss'
House subcommittee conducted a thorough investigation
and released the first comprehensive report detailing
critical shortfalls within the United States
intelligence community's performance and technological
capabilities. In May of 2006, Chambliss was honored
with the CIA Director's Award by the Director of
Central Intelligence. Recognized for his
"extraordinary fidelity and essential service" to the
CIA, Chambliss received the agency's highest award.
As a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee,
Chambliss continues Georgia's longstanding tradition
of leadership and advocacy for the state's military
installations. Following in the footsteps of former
Senators Richard B. Russell, Jr., and Sam Nunn,
Chambliss is a strong voice for Georgia's defense
industry and the military community. Throughout the
2005 Base Realignment and Closure round, Chambliss has
remained steadfast in defense of Georgia's bases
targeted for closure and has also been a tireless
advocate to improve the quality of life for our troops
and their families.
In 1994, Chambliss was first elected to Congress to
represent Georgia's 8th congressional district.
Throughout his legislative career, Chambliss has been
honored with numerous awards from both the private and
public sector for his work in the fields of
agriculture, defense, budget, and national security.
He is a past recipient of the Air Force Association's
W. Stuart Symington Award, the top civilian award
given annually for outstanding contributions in the
field of national security and was awarded the Reserve
Officers Association's Minuteman of the Year Award in
2005.
Chambliss is a member of the Senate Caucus on Military
Depots, Arsenals and Ammunition Plants, the
Congressional Sportsmen Foundation, the Congressional
Fire Services Caucus, the Rural Health Caucus, the
Juvenile Diabetes Caucus and he is the co-chair of the
Senate Reserve Caucus.
Chambliss earned a Bachelor's degree in Business
Administration from the University of Georgia in 1966
and earned his Juris Doctor degree from the University
of Tennessee College of Law in 1968. Chambliss and his
wife, Julianne, have been married since 1966, and
reside in Moultrie, Georgia. They have two children
and two grandchildren.
**Bridget**
Chapter 5- IB summary Cross-Culural Negotiation and Decision Making
Chapter 5: Cross-cultural Negotiation and Decision Making [IB]
Opening Profile: Bechtel and GE Benefit from Enron's Failed Negotiations over Dabhol Plant
Betchel and GE bought out partner Enron's 65% share in Dabhol from a bankruptcy court for $22M. Goal is to restart the 740-megawatt plant, idle for almost 3 years. Dabhol went bankrupt in May 2001 when state electricity board stopped paying the bills, citing the cost was too high. Now that Dabhol has been consolidated into one place, Betchel and GE, partner's in this venture are in negotiations to sell to some of India's biggest non-government energy companies.
Negotiation : The Negotiation Process comprised of 5 stages (order may vary and relationship building can be continuous) where two or more parties aim to reach a mutually acceptable agreement.
Stage 1: Preparation- find out as much as possible about (1) the kinds of demands that may be made; (2) the composition o f the "opposing" team, and (3) the relative authority that the members possess Then you can gear your strategy, allocate roles, decide on concessions, and prepare action plan if negotiated situation cannot be found.
Stage 2: Relationship building- the process of getting to know one's contacts in a host country and building mutual trust before embarking on business discussions and transactions. (more focus & value world-wide than in U.S.). Entertaining, non-task sounding (nemawashi) – general conversation.
Stage 3: Exchanging Task-Related Information (presentation and state position; Q&A; alternatives discussed). Mexican negotiators give little substantive material and more lengthy, evasive information. French like to debate. Chinese ask any questions and give vague ambiguous information, but delve into details.
Information: Stage Four: Persuasion- hard bargaining starts. Majority of persuasion takes place over several negotiation sessions. Far East, details are usually worked out iahead of time through the backdoor approach (homnani). Japanese are more like Americans and less like Brazilian behaviors. Brazilians= fewer promises, threats, and so forth and Americans tend to be more alike in the use of these behaviors, but use commands less. "Dirty Tricks", tactic often used to mislead the opponents deliberately. Another tactic, place opposing negotiator in stressful situation (uncomfortable temp, rudeness, too bright light, interruptions, etc.). American's see as dirty or misleading may be cultural norm to mislead at first. Persuasion primary purpose. Brazilians interrupt, touch and facial gaze often. Japanese tend to use more silent periods and interruptions but less facial gazing than Americans. Japanese and Americans did not touch other than handshake.
Stage Five: Concessions and Agreement- last stage of negotiation, tactics vary greatly across cultures. Chinese & Russians are prepared to ask for more than they expect to get; Swedes start with what they are prepared to accept. Better Results are attained when bargaining with extreme positions. Asking for more than you hope to gain. Careful timing of the disclosure of information. Only tell what and when needed.
Understanding Negotiation Styles - Comparison of negotiation styles (Japanese; North American; Latin American) see page 155. Brazilians: spontaneous, passionate, and dynamic style; use the word 'No' extensively; lots of physical contact. Japanese: skillful, calm, quiet, patient negotiators; accustomed to long, detailed negotiating sessions. Americans: plunge straight to the matter at hand. Westerners and Arabs believe time is money; where other cultures build relationships and delay with haggling.
Successful Negotiations Around the World: Profiles of American, Indian, Arab, Swedish, and Italian negotiators, according to Pierre Casse, and give some insight into what to expect from different negotiators and what they expect. Pg. 156-158.
Managing Negotiation - The successful management of intercultural negotiations require a manager to go beyond a generalized understanding of the issues and variables involve. 1. Gain specific knowledge 2. Prepare accordingly to adjust to and control the situation 3. Be innovative. Huthwaite Research Group- reveals how successful negotiators, compared to average negotiators, manage the planning process and face-to- face behavior.
Using the Web to Support Negotiations- can provide support for negotiations, but cannot replace the face-to-face. (NSS- Negotiation support system) decreases direct and indirect costs of neg.
E-Negotiations- negotiations carried through e-commerce
Management Focus: Samsung's e-Chaelbol - internet becomes middleman for trading auctions. FishRound: online marketplace for frozen fish, CareCamp- e-marketplace for medical equipment, etc.
Comparative Management in Focus: Negotiating with the Chinese - cultural barriers on both sides when US vs. China. Two major areas of conflict: 1. The amount of detail the Chinese want about product characteristics and 2. Their apparent insincerity about reaching an agreement
Chinese negotiation process 3 cultural norms: ingrained politeness and emotional restraint; emphasis on social obligations; belief in the interconnection of work, family, and friendship. Avoid open conflict to save face: Lien (moral character); Mien-tzu (one's reputation or prestige).
Managing Conflict Resolution - differing communication styles Low-Context vs. High-context usually lead to confict. Low-context such as U.S.= instrumental oriented (conflict separate from task); High-context such as Middle East (avoid conflict) = expressive oriented (handle conflict indirectly) otherwise insulting and lose face.
Decision Making
The Influence of Culture on Decision Making- crucial to understand as culture affects decision making through the broader context of the nation's institutional culture, collective patterns of decision making & value system that affects decision maker's perception of situation.
Approaches to Decision Making : value system- utilitarian system vs. moral idealism in a society affects its overall approach to the world. Who has authority- Autocratic vs. participative; Country's orientation- individualistic vs. collectivist; Culture affects speed- how fast or slow a decision is made.
Comparative Management in Focus: Decision Making in Japanese Companies - three levels of negotiation in Japanese culture of collectivism and share responsibility = ringi system of decision making. (cumbersome and very time-consuming prior to the implementation stage)
1. nemawashi process: used to gain consensus
2. ringi: more formal authorization procedure begins
3. ringi-sho: passed up through successive layers of management for approval – the approval made by official seals. (Showing collective agreement)
Conclusion: Competitive positioning and long-term successful operations in a global market require a working knowledge of the decision-making and negotiating processes of managers form different countries. One cannot negotiate without making decisions.
My Time or Yours
The use of Global Virtual Teams (GTVs) is increasing among organizations, to help them accomplish their goals.
• Increase communication
• More productive, bridge across global time zones so they can be more productive.
• Overnight feedback. As for feedback in NY at night from Tokyo, and have a response first thing in the morning
• However, can create coordination difficulties due to differences in time.
What is time?
• Different perceptions across cultures.
• Very subjective, varies across continents, countries, time zones.
• Hard to explain, psychologist try to explain it as “objective” time and “subjective” time
• Can be lost, spend, or wasted following western perceptions
• Helps employees get paid. Tool for production. Time is a constraint in the production process.
Event
• Event time vision perceives time as cyclical, continuous, and epochal.
• Example: Two minute exchange of business cards between Japanese executives meeting for the first time.
Regions where Hinduism or Buddhism predominates tend to adopt the timeless notion of time. Also, view synchronization as critical aspect of time
In contrast, harmonic is the sense of time (timelessness) in Confucianism and Taoism. Promote a time vision based in harmony.
Time Vision and Organizations
• Depends among societies and work organizations
• Time vision of time of individuals is shaped by society. So, it varies across societies
• Organizations know how to determine time constraints and know when to expect actions to happen.
Virtual Teams and Time Visions
• Managers try to reconcile time vision differences among participants in GVTs
• Different time visions affect the performance of a GTV.
• GTV members hold a time vision in terms of completion of a series of activities.
• GTVs have to agree in time for deliverables. Be clear about it.
• Synchronizing time. Achieve a team rhythm
• GTVs need to maintain rhythm around intense face-to-face interaction
• Toyoda Kiichiro, founder of Toyota view synchronization importance
• Allocating time. Performance measures. Time is accounted to measure labor costs, estimates. Time measures activities with predictable durations, sequencing, and interactions.
• All described above, has to be well managed.
• Scheduling and synchronizing may be linked to deadlines. This calls for managing time focus and allocation. Place priorities and values first.
• Create awareness of time among GTVs. Team members whose views of time differ a lot from those in the other side of the communication line, may exhibit withdrawal behaviors such as low satisfaction, absenteeism, and turnovers. When developing timelines, managers have to consider different time synchronization among members.
Developing and Facilitation of time visions
• Facilitating the development of team norms, so everybody is in the same page. GTV leaders should lay the groundwork for developing norms, with the help of the team interaction
• Matching technology with time visions is very important, because is the bridge used for communication. Automated scheduling tools such as GANTT and PERT charts, make team members, especially members with cyclical time visions, aware of the team schedules.
• Avoid time language traps that can be hard to interpret to different cultures. “I’ll be there in a minute”, “wait a minute”, “I’ll be with you in a minute”. These can be confusing to a non-western. Specify the latest an activity can start, the time before an activity may not start, the earliest an activity may cease, the latest and activity must be completed. Also, time writing has to be clear: 1:59:55, 2 p.m., 2:01, be there before 2.
GTVs challenges
• Create awareness of the different time visions among team members
• Facilitate the development of time-related team norms
• Create an intersubjective time vision
• Avoid time languages traps
• Apply multiple, appropriate performance measures that reflect sensitivity to differing time visions.
Monday, October 29, 2007
IB Reading Summary: "Five Steps to Creating a Global Knowledge-Sharing System: Siemens' Share Net"
Introduction:
The cumulative knowledge that a company is able to access from inside and outside the organization is often regarded as a sustainable resource for competitive advantage. One of the success stories is with Siemens' (one of the world's largest organizations) ShareNet, a global knowledge-sharing system. This system passed through 5 major steps to ensure sustainable performance and value added contribution. Although technical aspects (reliability and usability) are a prerequisite for performance, this article focuses on the global character and rollout phase, the cross-cultural implications, with a detailed focus on the experience in China.
Global Knowledge Transfer and Cross-Cultural Challenges:
Conceptually there are 5 elements, pointing at organizational, psychological and technical factors that have to be fulfilled in order to enable the use of transferred knowledge within an organization: 1. perceived value of the source unit's knowledge, 2. willingness to share knowledge, 3. the existence and richness of transmission channels, 4. the willingness to acquire knowledge from the source, and 5. the absorptive capacity of the receiving unit. Apart from just these Knowledge Management Systems (KMS), though, the information must also pass through a knowledge integration phase (internalized by the receiving unit – how 'sticky' is the knowledge for the receiving unit).
Research Approach:
2 phases: 1) 116 interviews concentrated in hi-tech and consulting industries w/iNorth America, looking for good KMS examples. 2) identified Siemens' as a 'best practice' source in KMS, conducted investigation into the implementation process and global establishment of ShareNet, interviewed 35 executives internationally and incorporated hard data to support results (manuals, internal presentations, etc.).
5 Steps to Creating a Global Knowledge-Sharing System:
Based in Munich, Germany, Siemens is giant global electronics firm – involved in info and communication systems, products and services, semiconductors, passive and electromechanical components, transportation, energy, health care, household appliances, lighting and other businesses.
1998: Siemens restructures their corporate groups to better offer total/comprehensive solutions to clients (moving away from 'simple' product seller). Info and Communication Networks (ICN) is the departmental bridge between the carrier and enterprise branches of Siemens Telecom, realizes they have a rich body of experience that needs to be grouped for best use. Joachim Döring, President of Group Strategy at ICN, heads up this initiative.
Step 1: Define the Concept:
Not just a data repository, Döring's idea was to create a system that was able to handle not only explicit knowledge, but also help externalize the individuals' tacit knowledge by 'codifying' it (a technique best suited for organizations that reuse the same knowledge repeatedly, and therefore require a scalable knowledge-sharing approach that enables efficient knowledge transfer). He gathered an early team to map out broad classifications of knowledge and establish an organizational structure for the knowledge. The components would include: knowledge library, forum for urgent requests, platforms to enable 'rich' information transmissions. The library would be composed of knowledge bids, constructed to categorize the experience gained from ongoing and completed projects, and was compiled using an important questionnaire that captured all of the tacit knowledge (not just the hard details). The urgent request forum would be a place for users to post and check for answers to questi
ons like, "how dangerous is it to lay cables in the Amazon rainforest?" A PM in Senegal answered w/I a few hours and his knowledge saved the South American project $1million Euros. It was also decided that the rollout should not be Munich-driven, that it should be tested in satellite environments to gain cross-cultural insights from people removed from HQ.
Step 2: Global Rollout
First version rolled out in 1999, launched in 39 countries with a "GLOCAL" emphasis – creating mutual trust to facilitate cross-cultural knowledge-sharing, to address the bias of both global integration and local responsiveness. The system would be centrally maintained in Munich in English, but local ShareNet managers were selected, trained in 2-3 day workshops and given incentives to promote the initiative and the concept of knowledge-sharing at local level. Consultants were also hired at the local level to provide support, organize and manage conferences and interface with the local ShareNet managers to bid feedback and control input quality. Global editors oversaw the clarity and usefulness of contributions, reviewed ways in which entered solutions could be understood and reused efficiently.
PROS: benefits became almost immediately evident. The urgent requests platform gave even smaller satellites a powerful forum to access other field people struggling with similar problems. This evident usefulness helped overcome language and culture barriers. Chinese (large part of Siemens' corporation structure) especially took to the system because it satisfied the Confucian principle of 'personal steadiness', 'respect for tradition', 'contributing to the long-term harmony' (Chinese averaged 16.7 KM contributions per worker vs. only 3.3 in the US). Moreover, system was offered gratis, which promoted its use - rather than encountering budget constraints that would limit employees' use of the system.
CONS: Small percentage of German workers were resentful of its English-language orientation, but the system's evident usefulness overcame this concern. Some language concessions had to be made for the lower-level Chinese workers, who may have been reluctant to contribute out of wanting to 'save face' due to sub-par English language skills.
Step 3: Bringing momentum into the system:
They encountered a couple of challenges – people that said they didn't have time to spend on it and others that resented sharing knowledge 'for free.' Still others didn't believe that the clarity in issues regarding their own projects would translate well for others. (These challenges were also observed in other companies with KMS.)
So they implemented an incentive system to encourage contributions. Initially these were bonuses, but in China and India to prevent overuse of the bonuses (to where employees would neglect their regular work in favor of earning 'contribution' bonuses), they changed the incentives to accessories and gift items rather than cash.
Step 4: Expanding Group-Wide
By 2001, ShareNet expanded into the R&D sectors, too. The system was adapted to relevant criteria and parameters for R&D knowledge (more specific and complex than in other units, which had heretofore contributed to its problematic transfer ability). But, by 2002 a different context obstacle had been encountered: knowledge protectiveness and 'shielding mechanisms' that hindered knowledge flow b/w different R&D units. To overcome this, Munich R&D HQ had to set the tone for open communication, and train others to view the strong personal benefit of knowledge sharing. (Once they started, however, satellite engineers took to it faster and better than the Munich counterparts.)
Step 5: consolidating and sustaining performance
The economic downturn caused Siemens to have to reorg staff and divisions in all corporate areas and the ShareNet team was transferred over to a newly-established Competence and Knowledge Management department. The reorgs had the following effect on the knowledge contributions: although the urgent request platform remained highly in use, the knowledge libraries saw fewer and fewer contributions. Discussions on the performance and value of ShareNet led them to begin to document the impact that it had had on ICN's businesses since implementation. The final calculation showed that ShareNet had generated 5 million Euros since its inception in 1988, but this is just a rough estimate because the cost side of the equation had to approximately quantify time-spent, opportunity cost of employee-time-spent, opportunity cost of employee time-spent answering urgent requests, etc. The fundamental premise, however, is that a knowledge-sharing system that is actively used by its employees can
improve performance and may produce a long-term sustainable competitive advantage for the organization.
Learning Outcomes and Implications for Global Practice:
The first three steps in implementation focused on the systematic methods of implementing a knowledge-sharing system, but the crucial task for Siemens' has been to manage the employee obstacles and the crisis resulting from the economic downturn. The system has shown that, even with minimum costs, the system is able to create value for the company and gain its users' acceptance. The timing of the rollout was also crucial, too; it seems obvious that he launch of an entirely new project would have been difficult to accomplish during economically bad times such as in 2001/2002. The insight is that profiting from such an enabling context and anchoring the system within the organization are necessary actions to survive when contrary winds are encountered.
Limitations and Future Challenges:
The Siemens case supports the view that just-in-time delivery of context-specific knowledge can significantly improve performance because it reveals that a thoughtful implementation of a knowledge-sharing system enhances the transfer of knowledge within a global organization and can therefore create value. However, there are certain limitations: 1) on the financial side, it will always remain a significant cost since supervision can only be automated to a certain degree (required dedicated personnel resources); 2) sharing tacit knowledge through a virtual medium has communication and context limitations (some situations may require personal interaction for the knowledge receiver to understand the source's context); 3) the current knowledge platform is limited in media richness and can therefore only create 'weak ties' within the organization.
However, Siemens is committed to the advancement of their KMS. The CEO Heinrich von Pierer desires "to truly release this treasure trove of experience…one of our key competitive advantages."
(Recommend readers briefly scan the Table 2 on page 20 of the article to see the bulleted learning outcomes designated by implementation phase.)
Carol Sautter
404-610-6660
cj_sautter@yahoo.com
Chapter 4 Communicating Across Cultures
This chapter is abou the various ways communicating
affects the sender and receiver in management
situations. When language is a communcation barrier,
there are many other ways to communicate meaning.
I. The Communication Process
• Communication-describes the process of sharing
meaning by transmitting messages through media such as
words, behavior, or material artifacts
• Communication is a complex process of linking up or
sharing perceptual fields of sender and receiver
• The sender builds a bridge to the life space of the
receiver
• Cultural noise: the cultural variables that
undermine the communications of intended meaning
• Attribution-looking for an explanation for another
person's behavior
II. The Culture-Communication Link
• Trust in Communication: create a clear and
calculated basis for mutual benefit, improve
predictability, develop mutual bonding thorough
regular socializing and friendly contact
• Cultural variables: attitudes, social organization,
thought patterns, roles, language, nonverbal
communication-kinesic/proxemics, time-monochronic
cultures (U.S., Switzerland-individualists) and
polychromic cultures (Latin, Arab-collectivists),
context-high context, feelings not explicitly
expressed, low-context, explicit about thoughts or
feelings
III. Information Technology: Going Global and Acting
Local
• Communication channels-information systems-the
systematic flow of information within an
organization-correlates with the context level of the
cultural; Japanese example
IV. Managing Cross-Cultural Communication
• Developing cultural sensitivity, careful encoding,
selective transmission, careful decoding of feedback,
V. Conclusion
• Effective intercultural communication is a vital
skill for international managers and domestic mangers
with international workforces. Cultural variables and
the manner in which culture is communicated underlie
the processes of negotiation and decision making.
My Time or Yours?
- a linier view of time
- time can be lost, spent, used, saved
- cyclical, continuous (holistic), and epochal
- unfolding of time, passing from one phase of an activity
- emphasis on the passing from one phase of an activity to another, rather than time involved
- ritual tradition
- long-term, abstract, recurrent, epochal
- simultaneous destruction and creation
- passage of time is insignificant
- soul searches for timeless state
- long-term, cyclical, continuous, and recurrent
- a dynamic of life
- time is valuable, punctuality important
- scheduling time: deadlines
- synchronizing time: team rhythms
- allocating time: performance measures
- Managing time visions
- Creating awareness of the differences
- Facilitating the development of team norms
- Creating an intersubjective time vision
- Avoid language traps
- Apply the appropriate measures of performance
Cross-border transfer of knowledge: Cultural Lessons from Project GLOBE
- A huge increase in cross-border knowledge has increased (and will continue to increase) the need for effective cross-border knowledge transfer.
A real-life case: NORDED (a Nordic European business school)
- Wanted to establish a base in South Asia. Signed agreement with TAI BANK to train managers about leadership and management of change. It was the largest investment the bank had ever made in training and development. Goal was to help TAI BANK transition from local bank to major regional player. Cultural differences soured the relationship between the two parties and could’ve been avoided if they had been identified ahead of time. TAI BANK’s senior management had a top-down communication and decision making style that frustrated middle management. TAI BANK made curriculum changes without discussing it with NORDED.
- The cultural differences between NORDED and TAI BANK were substantial (measured by the avg. distance between rankings on all 9 dimensions listed below), especially power distance differences and differences in uncertainty avoidance.
- Strong personal ties were not developed between the 2 organizations, so the continuity of the program was in doubt. Regular high level contact could have reduced obstacles.
- Taking time to articulate common goals and criteria for success would have helped.
- GLOBE = Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness. Studied 62 societies worldwide. Goal of project: to develop empirically based theories to describe, understand and predict the impact of specific cultural variables on leadership effectiveness and organizational cultures in societies.
Nine cultural dimensions:
- Power Distance
- In-Group Collectivism
- Institutional Collectivism
- Uncertainty Avoidance
- Future Orientation
- Gender egalitarianism
- Assertiveness
- Humane Orientation
- Performance Orientation
Effective knowledge transfer is a function of:
- Value of the source unit’s store of knowledge
- Motivational disposition of the unit that sources the knowledge – shaped by national culture and motivational disposition
- Existence and richness of transmission channels – affected by cultural differences
- Motivational disposition of the unit to which the knowledge is directed
- Absorptive capacity or assimilation ability of the target unit.
GLOBE Advice on cross-border knowledge transfer:
- Define common goals in advance of knowledge transfer. First need to agree on the value of the knowledge to be transferred.
- Map the cultural profiles. Identify cultural differences that can have a negative impact and explore ways to address them.
- Assign relationship managers in cross-cultural transfers of knowledge. All parties should have cross-culturally aware individuals accountable for the success of the transfer.
- Learn from knowledge transfer – view it as a learning experience.
chapter 5
Chapter 5
I. Negotiation- process of discussion by which two or more parties aim to reach a mutually acceptable agreement
5 Stages:
1. Preparation:
· negotiators should familiarize themselves with the entire context and background of their counterparts
· must understand own and other parties' negotiation styles
· should know the value system, attitudes, and expected behaviors of the opposing team
· prior to the meeting find out what kinds of demands might be made, what the composition of the opposing team is and the level of authority that their members posses
2. Relationship building:
· Goal is to get to know one's contacts in the host country and to build mutual trust before beginning any business discussion
· Involves nontask sounding (nemawashi)- general, polite conversation, and informal communication before meetings
· Sometimes intermediaries are needed, these are people who already has the trust and respect of the foreign managers and can act as a "relationship bridge"
· Should also practice "posturing" which is the general discussion that sets the tone for the meeting and it should result in a feeling of cooperation
3. Exchanging task-related information:
· Consists of exchanging task-related info
· Each side typically makes a presentation and states its position, then Q&A
· Negotiators should focus both on presenting their own situation and in showing an understanding of their opponents' viewpoint
· Prepare for this stage by practicing role reversal
4. Persuasion
· Hard bargaining-parties try to persuade the other to accept more of their position and to give up some of their own
· Can face difficulties because of differences in the uses and interpretation of verbal and nonverbal behaviors
· Exhibit 5-4 shows list of recognizable bargaining tactics
· "dirty tricks" sometimes used- giving misleading or distorted factual info, using the excuse of ambiguous authority
· "Rough tactics" also used- designed to put opposing negotiators in a stressful situation physically or psychologically so that their giving in is more likely (uncomfortable room temp, too-bright lighting, take-it-or-leave-it attitude, etc.)
5. Concessions and Agreement
· Stage of concessions and agreement
· Decide ahead of time what your concession strategy will be
· Usually better end results are attained by starting with extreme positions
Managing negotiations
· must understand the position of the other parties in regard to their goals
· problem-solving approach is essential to successful cross-cultural negotiation
- requires that a negotiator treat everyone with respect
- avoid making anyone feel uncomfortable
- should not criticized or blame the other parties in a personal way that may make someone feel shame (lose face)
Successful negotiators
· consider a wider range of options
· pay greater attention to areas of common ground
· tend to make twice as many comments regarding long-term issues
· more likely to set upper and lower limits regarding specific points
· make fewer irritating comments ("We are making you a generous offer")
· use counterproposals less frequently
· use fewer reasons to back up arguments
· practice active listening
Using the Internet for Negotiations
· internet-based programs provide support for the negotiating process but can't take the place of face-to-face negotiations
· Negotiating Support Systems (NSS) program that provides support by finding zones of agreement, decreasing direct and indirect costs of negotiations, and maximizing the chances of optimal outcomes
· INSPIRE- web-based program that provides applications for preparing and conducting negotiations
Influence of culture in decision making:
· Culture affects decision making at the broader context of the nation's institutional culture- produces collective patterns of decision making
· Culture also affects decisions through culturally based value systems that affect an individual's perception of a situation
· 5 stages of rational decision-making process
1. Defining the problem
2. Gathering and analyzing relevant data
3. Considering alternatives
4. Deciding on best solution
5. Implementing decision
--
Maggie Mariscal
About Us

- Global Partners MBA Students
- Atlanta, GA, United States
- Shown in picture top-bottom, left-right: Denis Asonganyi, Carol Sautter, Del Moses, Shawn Butler, Christopher Kittrel, Michael Burke, Kim Parrish, Emily Tsang, Cherie Berkley, Lena Kim, Alaina Inman, Fumu Gakodi, Jaime LaTorre, Caro Katis, Melissa Efferth, Leslie Brown, Bridget Boyer, Rebecca Gould, Stas Garmash, Maggie Mariscal.